New Shun 1730

Just like using culture to control military force, it is the afterimage of the evil dragon of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.

Nowadays, the many magical dragon postures and many afterimages left by the late previous dynasty are the mainstream thoughts of Dashun at this time.

Of course, this afterimage is very beneficial to the implementation of some of Liu Yu's policies.

In other words, the state of being a fellow traveler can be borrowed.

For example, this time's salt reform issue and the related industrial and commercial development policies. Although opposition from the DPRK and China was loud, there were still supporters after all, etc., which also stemmed from the reflection on many issues in the late Ming Dynasty.

It's just that Liu Yu is using this kind of reflection to do things that have little to do with reflection.

For example, he did not think that abolishing quotation and changing votes was a creative reform, but he wanted to use the reflection on the situation in the late Ming Dynasty and the opportunity of the salt policy reform to carry out what he thought was a meaningful Huainan land reclamation reform.

His method of drying salt in large factories basically received compromising support from the reformists, which originated from some reflections on the late Ming Dynasty.

Still taking Wang Fuzhi as an example.

His views on land issues actually influenced many people.

The essence of this view, in Lao Ma's words, is that "the most experienced leaders of the ruling class always strive to increase the number of small private owners."

As experienced thinkers among the landlord class, many reflectors in the late Ming Dynasty came to a conclusion that was actually very simple.

Homeowners and small farmers are the pillars of the empire's stability.

All reforms should be based on protecting the stability of farmers as the best choice.

So, what is the conclusion to be drawn from this?

The conclusion drawn from this is that the state should control the salt industry, and according to the national budget, after controlling the salt industry production, it should be evenly distributed on the price of salt according to the budget, so as to complete the taxation on the production side.

If the state's expenditure is fixed.

Then, the tax levied on salt would not need to be levied from the homesteaders, thereby protecting small farmers.

When the empire was on the verge of collapse, it was not the tenants and miners, nor the noble gentry and merchants, who stood up to protect the empire. Those who could really stand up were the stable yeoman farmers, if there were any left.

Although it seems difficult to understand, do you think there is any difference between adding taxes on salt and directly levying land taxes?

In fact, there is a difference, because the homesteaders here specifically refer to the definitions in the Six Classics and ancient books - farmers with a field of 100 acres to 300 acres.

In this era when the average person has two and a half acres of land, it is actually more appropriate to call them small and medium-sized landowners. So this is the same as the "per-mouth tax" pursued by Wang Euzhi, which is an idea that benefits a specific class.

And here, we have to talk about the interpretation of the sages by the Confucian scholars of Dashun on the issue of salt tax.

Looking at the salt tax alone, it seems that the ideas of the sages are disorganized and even contradictory.

While talking about the time of Emperor Zhao of the Han Dynasty, the literary virtuous people wanted to cut off the salt and profit to return it to the people as a lenient policy. This was purely under the guise of "returning to the people", but in fact it was to benefit the big businessmen and wealthy businessmen. After all, the place where salt is produced is far from the place where salt is eaten. If the state operates a monopoly, although it is harsh, at least it will be within limits. But if merchants come, they will definitely drink the blood of the people without saving it at all.

Therefore, we must not let the salt benefit "move down", and we must make the mountains and seas official for the benefit of the world.

On the other side, he turned around and said that Guan Shanhai's government was really bad, making the people unable to afford salt at all. If we leave it to the market and businessmen to take charge, everything will be fine.

As the saying goes, if something is lacking, then the quick one will get it, and the dull one will blame himself for his own weakness. There is nothing to complain about. However, there is no punishment for smuggling, and there is no reason to fight for theft. Among the people, this means taking advantage of the lack of money to increase the price, and when the enemy has arrived, they are afraid that their enemies will not be attacked first, and the harm caused by the rich people will also be eliminated.

It would be best for the government to do nothing. Only in this way will the price of salt be stable. If it goes too high, there will definitely be businessmen trying to stabilize the price; if the salt industry is completely banned, there will be no private salt left.

This is a bit like later generations who praised the Ming Dynasty for its vigorous development of capitalism and its transition to a constitutional monarchy, and at the same time believed that the Ming Dynasty should strengthen its imperial power, continue to increase taxes in Jiangnan, and crack down on the Donglin Party.

Out of respect for the thinkers of the late Ming Dynasty, Confucian scholars in Dashun made many interpretations of this.

Finally, I finally came up with a fairly round interpretation of the past, that is to say, the tube mentioned here refers to the production end of the tube.

The production side needs to be managed.

The sales side should be released.

That's why this seemingly contradictory statement appears, but it is actually not contradictory.

Interpretation from this perspective also led to many disputes over this salt policy reform.

Because Liu Yu has been working on the reform of the production side, and on the sales side, he thinks that it is just a reform of the production side in the name of changing the sales side.

Therefore, Lin Min and other salt policy reformers did not consider the reform of the production side from the beginning. They only considered abolishing the hereditary salt import system and changing it to a free circulation system within the salt area.

For this reason, when the Confucian scholars raised by Yangzhou salt merchants write papers and make suggestions in associations, their focus cannot be on salt production and reform, but their focus can only be on safeguarding the interests of salt households.

Of course, the emperor, including some loyal and patriotic people in the court who truly cared about the country and the imperial power, including Lin Min and others, compromised and supported Liu Yu's salt reclamation policy. It was also because of Liu Yu's large-scale salt drying farm plan that the project was completed. The final conception of the salt policy after reflection at the end of the Ming Dynasty:

That is to say, "The official is in the land where salt is produced, collects the accumulation and sells it to the merchants." The official's overall plan is enough to enrich the country. The officials have the opportunity to cook salt, and the people benefit from circulation. Once you enter a merchant's boat or carriage, don't ask whether it is east or west, whether it is noble or cheap.】

The government levied taxes directly from the production end, and after the taxes were levied, merchants could sell as they pleased.

Of course, there were also a few small patches made by Liu Yu, such as readjusting the salt area, developing Sichuan well salt to cover Hubei, official bulk transportation to specific locations to reduce the possibility of merchants hoarding goods, and official control of certain salt for price regulation.

Finally, the court, including the emperor, supported such salt administration reform.

Its idea has nothing to do with the progress of productivity.

It is purely the idea of ​​[officials have the abundance of salt boiling, and the people get the benefits of circulation].

It is mainly a large number of small salt households, which are really troublesome to control and cannot be controlled at all. Moreover, the cost problem of Huainan salt was completely solved, so that even if part of the tax was added, it could still maintain a certain advantage over private salt.

Therefore, thanks to some policies of the previous dynasty and the many reflections of the ideological circles on the policies of the previous dynasty, under the shadow of the previous dynasty, the salt administration reform, including the fundamental plan to build a large salt field, is one of the few reforms of Liu Yu that conforms to the mainstream ideas of the ideological circles.

As for the issue of salt households and enclosure, as well as the current reality of Yangzhou students shouting slogans "for the benefit of salt households", Lin Min actually feels like he is watching a joke.

Although it is not as ridiculous as Liu Yu said, waving the people's beggar's bag with feudal emblems on their buttocks, they have their own funny points.

Lin Min thinks this is the authentic "someone who speaks plausibly but is not righteous".

As for whether these students' petitions can be supported, it is unlikely to get support outside the interest groups in the court anyway.

This can be explained very easily by using a paragraph from Lao Ma's "Letter from the Committee to the Alliance".

[They (petty bourgeoisie, small farmers, petty citizens)...demand the elimination of the oppression of small capital by big capital, the establishment of national credit institutions, and the promulgation of laws to ban usury, so that they and farmers can get loans from the state on preferential terms instead of from capitalists]

The problem lies in this loan.

According to the ideas of these students, it is definitely not possible to operate a purely government-run and government-collected model, and to follow the model of collecting salt at a full official price before the emergence of the Ming Dynasty's surplus salt system.

There is no need to think about this. To control small salt households with a population of tens of thousands, it is also necessary to ensure official collection, ensure that there is no smuggling, and ensure that salt households voluntarily hand in salt or are forced to hand it in... No matter which one, it is too difficult.

Under the purchase system, some salt households are lazy and some are diligent, there are unexpected events, and people are sick and healthy. Some people will definitely not be able to hold on and support production.

If merchants are not allowed to enter the market, then the national credit institution must issue small loans to these salt households, right?

The interest rate cannot be high, otherwise it cannot be repaid at all. Moreover, there is no collateral, even the grass marshes and stove pits, the ownership belongs to the court, and the salt households only have the right to operate.

To provide low-interest loans to such people, does the court have money to spend?

Spend a high price to support a group of small salt households whose salt production costs are about 15 times that of the Huaibei Salt Field?

Why not use the money earned from the large salt field at low cost to raise an army and directly slaughter the rebels? This is more cost-effective.

Those who really know how to calculate in the court will calculate it this way.

As for the enclosure of land for cotton planting itself, there is even more to say.

Although it is said that the knowledge recognized by Dashun is the Yongjia and Yongkang schools, the system was not established after all, but some of the words in it are still helpful to Liu Yu's enclosure movement.

For example, Mr. Shuixin Ye Shi specifically talked about this issue:

[The rich are the foundation of the prefectures and counties, and the ones that the upper and lower levels rely on]

Why is it said that the upper and lower levels rely on? Of course, there is an explanation.

Let's not talk about the upper level's reliance. It is theoretically more convenient for officials to collect taxes from the rich. Of course, it is only theoretically more convenient.

And what about the lower level's reliance?

First: the common people have no land, rent it from the rich, and the rich support the common people.

Second: What if you have land but don't have money to farm? You can borrow usury from the rich.

Third: If there is a disaster or something, in case of an emergency, ask the rich for help.

Fourth: If you really can't make it, sell yourself as a slave, and only the rich can buy it, the poor can't afford it.

Fifth: Artisans, singers, dancers, all have to rely on the rich for food.

Of course, the rich here refers to the big landlords. Then with a slight change, those who enclose land to grow cotton are considered big landlords or agricultural capitalists, which can be fooled.

And thanks to the previous dynasty's extortion, corruption of officials, and collapse of the grassroots, there is also such a famous theory in the reflection of the previous dynasty.

[Big merchants enrich the people, and the fate of the country! ]

The court has poor control over the grassroots, and the emperor is like a colonizer who only knows how to collect taxes to support his relatives. There is little relief when encountering natural disasters. At this time, big merchants and wealthy households have to lend money at high interest rates.

If it weren't for these people lending money at high interest rates, how many people would starve to death?

Moreover, these wealthy merchants and the people also play a huge role in "flowing gold and grain", circulating wealth and currency. Wealth, currency or commodities must flow to make them meaningful.

Although this theory is not very realistic in places where the economy is fragile and poor, it is likely to be taught a lesson by Liu Zongmin, Li Zicheng and others.

However, here, in Huainan, a special place where the small peasant power is the most vulnerable, it is applicable.

Relying on the knowledge of the Yongjia and Yongkang schools that were promoted but not implemented by the Dashun government, and relying on the remnant spirits of the evil dragons of the previous dynasty, it is really not a big deal for the Yangzhou students to oppose the enclosure of land.

At least morally, it can be explained away.